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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of equivalents was created to enlarge the scope of 
actionable patent infringement by providing a method for identifying 
non-literal infringement that should be prohibited and punishable by law, 
and in so doing “[t]o temper unsparing logic and prevent an infringer 
from stealing the benefit of the invention.”1  Under the doctrine of 
equivalents, if equivalence exists between the elements of an accused 
invention and the claimed elements of a patented invention, non-literal 
infringement also exists.2  The enlarged scope of patent protection 
provided by the doctrine of equivalents has been tailored to operate 
 *  The author would like to thank Daniel H. Shulman and Donald W. Rupert 
although he does not know them. This Note simply explores the ideas they first expressed.  
The author also thanks Professor Lisa Ramsey and all the Law Review editors for their 
insight and help.  An obligatory, yet heartfelt, thank you to his family as well. 
 1. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 
1948). 
 2. Id. 




within certain restraining principles, such as the all elements rule, 
prosecution history estoppel, and specification estoppel.3
After nearly a half century of application and interpretation of the 
doctrine of equivalents, a new restraining doctrine emerged from the 
Supreme Court’s 1997 opinion in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chemical Co.4 This new doctrine has been dubbed the claim vitiation 
doctrine.5  The claim vitiation doctrine drastically limits the doctrine of 
equivalents by permitting courts to decide, as a matter of law, whether or 
not an alleged equivalent element of an invention vitiates a claim 
limitation of a patented invention.6  If a court finds that a patent claim 
must be vitiated in order to find equivalency, the alleged infringing 
element cannot be an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents, and 
infringement has not occurred.7 The claim vitiation doctrine, as it is 
interpreted in many Federal Circuit opinions, arguably destroys any 
plausible use of the doctrine of equivalents, making any infringement 
 3. The all elements rule requires equivalency determination on an element-by-
element basis instead of by examining the involved inventions as a whole.  Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).  The prosecution 
history estoppel rule provides that a patentee cannot reclaim a scope of equivalents 
which he had given up, for certain reasons, during the prosecution of the patent.  
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34 
(2002).  Specification estoppel provides that where a “specification makes clear that the 
invention does not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the 
reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without 
reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the 
feature in question.”  SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 
1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  The specification is a written portion of the patent that 
describes the invention.  The specification “names all the parts or components of the 
invention, describes how they work, and illustrates how they work together to perform 
the invention’s function.”  ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, 112-13 (3d ed. Aspen 
Publishers 2003). A patent’s claims are elements of the invention’s precise legal 
definition.  Id.  The claims set the boundaries of the protection and rights that the patent 
confers.  Id.  Patent claims can be viewed as limitations on what the patent protects.  Id. 
 4. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17. 
 5. The authors of an article in the Federal Circuit Bar Journal coined the phrase 
“claim vitiation doctrine.” See Daniel H. Shulman & Donald W. Rupert, “Vitiating” the 
Doctrine of Equivalents: A New Patent Law Doctrine, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 457, 464-65 
(2003). 
 6. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8; Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 
464-65. 
 7. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8; Bell Atl. Network Servs. v. Covad 
Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Durel Corp. v. Osram 
Sylvania, Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  Put another way, “equivalence is 
inapplicable if the significance of a limitation is lost by broadening it to afford 
equivalence.”  Gary Odom, Have a Seat, THE PATENT PROSPECTOR: AN OPEN FORUM OF 
PATENT INFORMATION AND OPINION, http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/archives/2005/08/ 
have_a_seat.html (Aug. 12, 2005, 14:02 PST); Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 464-
65. 
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less than literal infringement very difficult to prove.8  This new doctrine 
has taken on several forms which are inconsistently applied throughout 
the Federal Circuit, plaguing patentees, their attorneys, and the courts.9  
A recent case, Freedman Seating Co. v. American Seating Co.,10 
exemplifies the confusion the claim vitiation doctrine creates.  By 
examining Freedman within the framework of the other claim vitiation 
doctrine cases it becomes apparent that changes must be made to the 
existing state of the law. 
The confusion and inconsistency created by the several interpretations 
of the claim vitiation doctrine can be remedied by either abandoning the 
doctrine or by creating one explicit version of the claim vitiation 
doctrine to be predictably and evenhandedly applied.11  The simplest and 
most effective solution would be express abandonment of the doctrine 
by judicial ruling. The Federal Circuit or Supreme Court should trace the 
doctrine back to its roots in Warner-Jenkinson and explicitly decry the 
portion of that ruling that lead to the claim vitiation doctrine. 
II.  THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 
The modern form of the doctrine of equivalents was first set forth in 
1950 by the Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. 
Linde Air Products Co.12  The Court reasoned that limiting recovery for 
patent infringement solely to literal infringement situations left open the 
opportunity for an “unscrupulous copyist” to make insubstantial changes 
to the patented material without being subject to the penalties for 
infringement.13  The Court set forth the doctrine of equivalents to curb 
the actions of such unscrupulous copyists.  The doctrine of equivalents 
attempted to balance protection for the patentee against the statutory 
 8. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1314 
(Fed. Cir. 1998); Dennis Crouch, CAFC Further Vitiates Doctrine of Equivalents, 
PATENTLY-O: PATENT LAW BLOG, http://www.patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/08/ 
cafc_further_vi.html (Aug. 11, 2005, 12:34 PST); see also Cooper Cameron Corp. v. 
Kvaerner Oilfield Prods. Inc., 291 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Durel Corp., 256 
F.3d at 1305. 
 9. See Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 464-65. 
 10. Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 11. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 488. 
 12. 339 U.S. 605, 608-10 (1950).  The doctrine’s actual origination occurred 
almost one hundred years earlier in Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 341-42 
(1853). 
 13. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607. 




requirement that patent claims state clear boundaries of the scope of the 
patent granted.14
This balanced protection is achieved by examining the differences 
between the claims of the patent and the corresponding elements of the 
alleged infringing invention.15  If the variations between the two are so 
insubstantial that the two elements could be considered equivalent, then 
infringement pursuant to the doctrine of equivalents has occurred.16  The 
doctrine should be invoked when an alleged infringing element 
“performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way 
to obtain the same result” as the patented subject matter.17  This 
function-way-result examination is the traditional doctrine of equivalents 
analysis by which juries make equivalency determinations.18
In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., the Supreme 
Court reexamined and refined its analysis of the doctrine of equivalents.  
Warner-Jenkinson and Hilton Davis both were in the manufacturing 
dyes business.  Hilton Davis held a patent19 for an ultra-filtration process 
to remove impurities from dyes which operated within a certain pH 
range.20  Hilton Davis had filed an amendment to its claims during patent 
prosecution, which created a controversy when competitor Warner-
Jenkinson developed a similar process.21  The Court held that the 
amendment which created the limitation of “at a pH from approximately 
 14. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33-34 
(1997); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 
1998).  A patent only provides protection for what is described in its claims. See 35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2000).  Section 112 also requires that a patent include (1) a written 
description of the invention, (2) a description of the best mode of the invention 
envisioned by the inventor, and (3) that the patent as written enable one skilled in the art 
to reduce it to practice without undue experimentation.  Id. 
 15. Multiform Desiccants, 133 F.3d at 1480. 
 16. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608. 
 17. Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929) (quoting Union 
Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877). 
 18. Derek Walter, Prosecution History Estoppel in the Post-Festo Era: The 
Increased Importance of Determining What Constitutes a Relevant Narrowing Claim 
Amendment, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123, 125 (2005).  In addition to the way-function-
result test, the Federal Circuit has occasionally applied a more general “insubstantial 
differences” test.  Id.  This insubstantial differences test views patent claim elements as 
being “equivalently present in an accused device if only ‘insubstantial differences’ 
distinguish the missing claim element from the corresponding aspects of the accused 
device.”  Sage Prods. v. Devon Indus., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
Determinations of equivalency are questions of fact to be adjudged by a jury.  Bai v. L & 
L Wing, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 19. The patent held was United States Patent No. 4,560,746 (the ‘746 patent).  
Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 21. 
 20. Id. at 21-22.  A substance’s pH measures its acidity or alkalinity.  Id. at 22 n.1.  
A pH of 7.0 is that of pure water; lower numbers indicate acidity while higher numbers 
indicate alkalinity.  Id. 
 21. See id. at 22-23. 
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6.0 to 9.0” did not preclude the use of the doctrine of equivalents to find 
infringement by Warner-Jenkinson’s process which operated below a pH 
of 6.0.22  Warner-Jenkinson’s process operated at a pH lower than the 
range claimed in Hilton Davis’s patented process, and therefore did not 
literally infringe.23  However, the Court could have found Warner-
Jenkinson’s process to be infringing under the doctrine of equivalents as 
long as it held that there was equivalence between the elements of the 
accused process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.24  
This boiled down to the question: Was a pH lower than 6.0 equivalent to 
“a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0?”  If the pH lower than 6.0 
performed substantially the same function in substantially the same way 
to achieve the same result as the pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0, the 
limitations would be considered equivalent, leading a court to conclude 
infringement existed. 
In Warner-Jenkinson, the Court addressed two concepts important to 
the operation of the doctrine of equivalents.  First, the Court held the 
doctrine required equivalency on an element-by-element basis instead of 
by examining the involved inventions as a whole.25  This element-by-
 22. See id. at 32-34.  The issue was actually remanded to the Federal Circuit to 
determine the reason behind Hilton Davis’s amendment regarding the operational pH 
level.  See id. at 34.  If the amendment, which narrowed the scope of the patent, was 
made for reasons relating to patentability, such as to avoid the prior art, then prosecution 
history estoppel would prevent Hilton Davis from claiming infringement by the doctrine 
of equivalents.  See id. at 33.  Put another way: If Hilton Davis had to limit its claimed 
pH range to obtain the patent, Hilton Davis then lost the ability to claim an equivalency 
that would expand the patent’s scope to encompass the range it gave up.  This illustrates 
how prosecution history estoppel limits the doctrine of equivalents.  Id. at 33-34. 
 23. See id. at 23.  Warner-Jenkinson’s process operated at a pH of 5.0, and Hilton 
Davis conceded that there was no literal infringement.  Id. 
 24. See Id. at 24-25.  The Supreme Court did not actually make a determination on 
the doctrine of equivalents issue due to the possibility of prosecution history estoppel.  
See id. at 41; supra note 23 and accompanying text.  The matter was remanded to the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals where it was held that, although the matter required 
remand to the district court for determination of the prosecution history estoppel issue, 
“sufficient record evidence to support the jury’s verdict of equivalence” existed.  Hilton 
Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  The 
Court found there was “substantial record evidence to prove that one of ordinary skill in 
the art would know that performing ultrafiltration at a pH of 5.0 will allow the membrane 
to perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way to reach 
substantially the same result as performing ultrafiltration at 6.0.”  Id.  Accordingly, “[t]he 
jury’s finding that the accused process with a pH of 5.0 is equivalent to the claimed 
process with a lower limit of approximately 6.0 does not therefore vitiate the claim 
limitation.”  Id.
 25. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29.  “Each element contained in a patent 
claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the 




element analysis is referred to as the all elements rule.26  The all 
elements rule acts as a restraint on the doctrine of equivalents.27  If 
equivalency is determined based on the invention as a whole, the scope 
of the invention as stated in the patent claims can be enlarged beyond its 
claims.28  However, “a distinction can be drawn . . . between substitution 
of an equivalent for a component in an invention and enlarging the metes 
and bounds of the invention beyond what is claimed.”29  By determining 
equivalency on an element-by-element basis, the courts do not enlarge a 
patent beyond the scope of its claims.30
Second, the Court reaffirmed the validity of prosecution history 
estoppel, which also serves as a restraint on the doctrine of equivalents.31  
Prosecution history estoppel is a well-established limitation on non-
literal infringement32 that applies to amendments made to a patent 
application “in order to meet objections in the Patent Office, based on 
references to the prior art.”33  Estoppel applies “where the initial claims 
were ‘rejected on the prior art,’ . . . and where the allegedly infringing 
equivalent element was outside of the revised claims and within the prior 
art that formed the basis for the rejection of the earlier claims.”34
The Court reaffirmed both of these concepts and the ways in which 
they interact with the doctrine of equivalents without expressing concern 
that the doctrine needed further limitation.35 The Court voiced its 
satisfaction with the existing state of the doctrine of equivalents, stating 
that “[s]o long as the doctrine of equivalents does not encroach beyond 
doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the 
invention as a whole.”  Id.  This element-by-element equivalency may enlarge the scope 
of individual elements while not expanding the actual scope of the invention as a whole, 
whereas determining equivalency at the invention level would run a greater risk of 
enlarging the scope of the invention as a whole.  See id.  This element-by-element 
determination was first implemented in the Federal Circuit in Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-
Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935-36 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 26. See, e.g., Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 27. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29. 
 28. See id. (citing Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 
1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting)). 
 29. Id. (quoting Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1573-74). 
 30. See id. “The ‘scope’ is not enlarged if courts do not go beyond the substitution 
of equivalent elements.”  Id. 
 31. See id. at 30, 34.  Prosecution history estoppel is the rule that a patentee cannot 
reclaim a scope of equivalents which he had given up, for reasons of patentability, during 
the prosecution of the patent.  See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34 (2002). 
 32. See id.  Non-literal infringement, as opposed to literal infringement, is simply 
another way of referring to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.  See 
Windbrella Prods. v. Taylor Made Golf Co., 414 F. Supp. 2d 305, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 33. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942). 
 34. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 31 (quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. Nw. Eng’g 
Corp., 294 U.S. 42, 48 n.6 (1935)). 
 35. See id. 
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the limits just described [concerning the all elements rule], or beyond 
related limits . . . , we are confident that the doctrine will not vitiate the 
central functions of the patent claims themselves.”36
In addition to its thorough examination of the all elements rule and 
prosecution history estoppel, Warner-Jenkinson is an influential case in 
that it contains a footnote which led to the formation and resulting 
permutations of the claim vitiation doctrine.37  The influential footnote 
reads: 
[U]nder the particular facts of a case, if prosecution history estoppel would 
apply or if a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate a particular claim 
element, partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the court, as there 
would be no further material issue for the jury to resolve . . . .  We leave it to 
the Federal Circuit how best to implement procedural improvements to promote 
certainty, consistency, and reviewability to this area of the law.38
When read in context this footnote appears to be an aside commenting 
on the concern that jury verdicts on infringement issues are developed in 
a “black-box” and therefore the actual method by which a jury reaches 
its verdict is unreviewable.39  The Court allays this concern by explaining 
how a court can take the infringement issue out of the jury’s hands in 
some instances.40  It simply reiterates the standard used in summary 
judgment: “partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the 
court, as there would be no further material issue for the jury to 
resolve.”41  The court’s language does not appear to express dissatisfaction 
with the manner in which the doctrine of equivalents was being applied, 
 36. Id. at 29-30.  The “related limits” referred to are the limits imposed by 
prosecution history estoppel.  See id. at 30. 
 37. See id. at 39 n.8; Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 463-64. 
 38. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. 
 39. See id.  The Court actually prefaces this footnote by stating “[w]ith regard to 
the concern over unreviewability due to black-box jury verdicts, we offer only guidance, 
not specific mandate.”  Id.  The term “black-box” refers to the undisclosed manner by 
which juries come to a verdict.  See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent 
Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209, 249 (2002).  
Black-box verdicts pose a problem for appellate review because the court lacks insight 
into the jury’s fact-finding or reasoning.  See id.  The Federal Circuit deals with this 
problem “by presuming that the jury found all facts in the record in support of the verdict 
it chose.  This evaluative process makes it much more difficult to overturn the black box 
jury verdict on appeal than it is to overturn a judge verdict.”  Id.  This presumption may 
lead courts to unknowingly sustain jury verdicts based on flawed reasoning and  
misunderstanding of both factual issues and the application of the law to the facts.  See id. 
 40. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n.8. The Court essentially reviews the 
appropriateness of granting summary judgment.  See id. 
 41. Id. 




nor does it seem to call for the formation of new limitations on the 
existing doctrine.42  However, as a result of interpretation of this 
language, a new limitation to the doctrine of equivalents was formed: the 
claim vitiation doctrine. 
III.  THE CLAIM VITIATION DOCTRINE43
Many Federal Circuit decisions cite the language in the Warner-
Jenkinson footnote as the authority behind the claim vitiation doctrine.44  
The claim vitiation doctrine can be generally described as a limitation on 
the doctrine of equivalents decided as a question of law by a judge; the 
judge determines whether a purported equivalent vitiates a claim 
limitation.45  Under the claim vitiation doctrine, non-literal infringement 
cannot occur as a matter of law if a finding of equivalency would vitiate 
or render a claim in the pre-existing patent meaningless.46
The application of the claim vitiation doctrine has diverged into two 
frequently used forms and other less frequently used forms.47  The two 
frequently applied interpretations of the claim vitiation doctrine can be 
referred to as the Lourie and Michel rules, named after the Federal 
Circuit Judges who advocated them most prominently.48
A. The Lourie Rule 
The Lourie rule treats every word in a claim as a “limitation on the 
scope of the patent that must be met in an identical way.”49  This rule 
represents a drastic narrowing of the scope of the doctrine of 
equivalents.  It has been applied to preclude any doctrine of equivalents 
 42. As previously mentioned, the Court stated “[s]o long as the doctrine of 
equivalents does not encroach beyond the limits just described [(the all elements rule)], 
or beyond related limits [(prosecution history estoppel)] . . . we are confident that the 
doctrine will not vitiate the central functions of the patent claims themselves.”  Id. at 29-
30. 
 43. See Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 464-65, for a much more 
comprehensive analysis and explanation of all things relating to the emergence and 
existence of the claim vitiation doctrine. 
 44. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Network Servs. v. Covad Commc’ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 
1258, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc. 156 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 45. A per curiam panel of the Federal Circuit wrote, “whether the application of 
the doctrine of equivalents wholly vitiates a claim limitation is a question of law, which 
we review de novo.”  Nova Biomedical, Corp. v. I-Stat Corp., 1999 WL 693881, at *1 
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 1999) (unpublished opinion). 
 46. See Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 464-65. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 464. 
 49. Id. at 465. 
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infringement where structural or spatial elements have been rearranged.50  
This removal of any possible equivalency for a spatial or structural 
rearrangement necessarily follows from this rule because the claim of 
any particular arrangement in a patent would be vitiated by any other 
arrangement of the same physical elements.51
For example, in Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical 
Corp. the Federal Circuit affirmed a summary judgment finding of non-
infringement because a specific surgical stapler mechanism was located 
on opposite ends of staplers which were otherwise the same.52  Writing 
for the court, Judge Lourie said the mechanism “is located at the far end 
of the [stapler], near the rear of the stapler.  Because the rear of the 
stapler is opposite the longitudinal slots, no reasonable jury could have 
found that the USSC lockout was substantially ‘connected to said 
longitudinal slots.’”53  Judge Lourie reasoned that for a specific mechanism 
located on one of the devices to be equivalent to the same mechanism 
located on the other end of the other device would necessarily vitiate the 
part of the claim designating the position of that mechanism.54  
Therefore, the court agreed that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact concerning the possibility of equivalency and upheld the non-
infringement verdict.55
This rationale does not sound illogical until the effect this strict 
interpretation can have on the doctrine of equivalents becomes apparent.  
According to the Lourie rule, an “unscrupulous copyist” may make an 
 50. See id. at 465-73.  The Shulman & Rupert article states that the Lourie Rule 
has been applied in the following cases: Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield 
Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 256 
F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2001); DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314 
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 
1309 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus Sys., Inc., 44 F. App’x 949 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (unpublished opinion); Smith Eng’g Co. v. Eisenmann Corp., 28 F. App’x 958, 
967 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (applied in Judge Linn’s dissent) (unpublished opinion).  Id. 
 51. This outcome arose in Cooper Cameron where the pre-existing patent claimed 
a certain object “between the two plugs.”  291 F.3d at 1319.  The alleged infringing 
device had the same object positioned above the two plugs.  Id.  The court upheld a 
summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine of equivalents without 
actually examining whether ‘above’ and ‘between’ could be substantially equivalent.  
See id. at 1322.  Instead it stated that “[w]ere we to ignore Cooper’s decision to claim in 
the ‘707 patent a workover port that connects to the assembly only ‘between’ the plugs, 
we would vitiate that limitation and thereby run afoul of the all-limitations rule.”  Id. 
 52. 149 F.3d 1309, 1318-19 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 53. Id. at 1319. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. 




insubstantial change in the positioning or arrangement of structural 
elements without subjection to the penalties of infringement, even if the 
new positioning or arrangement of the structural elements performs 
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve 
substantially the same result as the patented invention.  This result runs  
contrary to the policy behind the doctrine of equivalents.56  The factual 
inquiry into the surrounding circumstances playing a part in the 
traditional doctrine of equivalents analysis is entirely removed by 
woodenly holding that an arrangement of structural elements different 
than the arrangement claimed in a patent cannot be equivalent. This 
could lead to situations in which a “fraud on the patent” can be easily 
achieved by making insignificant changes in the overall invention.57
Consequently, the Lourie application of the claim vitiation doctrine 
creates considerable problems for patentees and patent applicants in 
drafting claims for structural or spatial limitations that provide meaningful 
protection from the unscrupulous copyist. Drafting a claim for a structural 
limitation that will withstand Lourie’s interpretation of the claim vitiation 
doctrine necessitates intricate and confusing wording.58  Requiring this 
type of drafting makes it very difficult to comply with one of the basic 
tenets of patent prosecution—that claims be clear and definite.59
B. The Michel Rule 
The second major interpretation of the claim vitiation doctrine, the 
Michel rule, can be simply stated: “An equivalent vitiates a claim 
 56. The policy behind the doctrine of equivalents is the balancing of protection for 
patentees from insubstantial changes to the subject matter of the patent against the public 
notice requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); Warner-Jenkinson 
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33-34 (1997); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. 
Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  That policy is part of the grander 
scheme to encourage innovation set forth in the U.S. Constitution: “The Congress shall 
have the power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 57. In the Graver Tank case the Court stated that “[t]he essence of the doctrine is 
that one may not practice a fraud on a patent.”  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air 
Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). 
 58. The Shulman & Rupert article provides an example of this problem using the 
facts from Cooper Cameron.  See supra note 51 (summarizing the facts of Cooper Cameron). 
[R]ather than claim a workover port between two plugs, one might claim a 
workover port disposed in a functional spatial relationship relative to the two 
plugs.  The applicant would then be obligated to disclose in the specification 
that a functional spatial relationship relative to the two plugs is preferably 
between, but could also include above or below. 
Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 482.  This disclosure certainly is neither the easiest 
nor most understandable way to word a claim for this spatial arrangement. 
 59. See 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
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limitation if the equivalent is excluded from the literal scope of the claim 
language.”60  Writing for the Federal Circuit in Athletic Alternatives, Inc. 
v. Prince Manufacturing, Inc., Judge Michel explained: “As a corollary 
to the ‘all limitations’ rule [i.e., the all elements rule] . . . we have held 
that ‘the concept of equivalency cannot embrace a structure that is 
specifically excluded from the scope of the claims.’”61  This ruling 
against the possibility of equivalency was achieved without any doctrine 
of equivalents analysis of whether the alleged infringing features 
performed substantially the same function, in substantially the same 
way, to achieve substantially the same result as the subject of the 
patent.62
Applying the Michel interpretation of the claim vitiation doctrine,   
practically any numerical limitation in a claim will specifically exclude 
anything outside of the numerical limitation from equivalency 
consideration.  For example, if the Michel rule was applied to the facts 
of the Warner-Jenkinson case,63 a pH of less than 6.0 could not by law 
be equivalent to a pH from 6.0 to 9.0 even if the two pH levels 
performed substantially the same function, in substantially the same 
way, to achieve substantially the same result.  This outcome provides 
insight as to the Court’s intentions in Warner-Jenkinson.  Had the Court 
intended its ruling to result in a claim vitiation doctrine like that which 
the Michel rule advocates, the Court would have ruled contrary to its 
actual holding.  The Court could not have intended the resultant Michel 
rule and still have held as it did that a pH of less than 6.0 could be 
equivalent to a pH from 6.0 to 9.0.64
 60. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 473. 
 61. 73 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & 
Evenflo Co., 16 F.3d 394, 400 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 62. Id.  A clear example of the absurdity of strictly applying the Michel rule is 
provided in Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
Moore had a patent on envelopes with strips of adhesive “extending the majority of the 
lengths” of the envelopes.  Id. at 1095.  The envelopes accused of infringement were 
similar to Moore’s except they had strips of adhesive which only ran 47.8% of the length 
of the envelope.  Id. at 1097.  The court was not persuaded by evidence that the two 
envelopes were insubstantially different from one another.  Id. at 1119.  Instead, the 
court held that the majority limitation would be vitiated by a finding that 47.8% was 
equivalent to 50.1% (a majority of the length).  Id. at 1106.  Therefore, as a matter of 
law, 47.8% of the length could not be equivalent to 50.1% of the length, and there could 
be no infringement.  Id. 
 63. See supra, Part II (discussing Warner-Jenkinson at a greater length). 
 64. See Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 478. 




This formulation of the doctrine creates a large burden for patentees 
and patent applicants whose claims include numerical limitations or 
ranges.65  In order for a patent with claims for numerical limitations or 
ranges to receive meaningful protection, the claims must be drafted as 
broadly as possible, which can lead to difficulty meeting the patent 
prosecution requirement that claims be clear and definite.66  However, its 
application is not limited to patents claiming numerical ranges.  It may 
effectively preclude traditional doctrine of equivalents analysis in any 
infringement action where there is a literal absence of a particular 
limitation regardless of the significance of that absence.67
C. Two Less Frequently Applied Forms of the                                           
Claim Vitiation Doctrine 
Two other general interpretations of the claim vitiation doctrine exist 
which have not been used as frequently as the Lourie or Michel 
interpretations.68  The first, referred to as the no limitation rule, applies 
the claim vitiation doctrine to preclude any equivalent that requires 
reading a limitation in the claims of a patent so broadly that the 
limitation no longer acts as a limitation at all.69  For example, in Tronzo 
v. Biomet, Inc., a claim for a device with a “generally conical outer 
surface” was not equivalent to a device with a hemispherical outer 
surface.70  There was no equivalence because if generally conical was 
given a wide enough range of equivalents to include a hemispherical 
shape, there would be no limitation at all.71  The court made this decision 
even though the two shapes would function in substantially the same 
way to achieve substantially the same result.72
 65. Id. at 483. 
 66. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 67. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 476-77.  Judge Michel demonstrated this 
line of reasoning in his dissent in Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co., 298 F.3d 
1302, 1314-17 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Michel, J., dissenting).  The patent at issue claimed 
“metal-to-metal bearing contact” as the connecting point between two pylons.  Id. at 
1306.  The alleged infringing product used a thin layer of wood between the two pylons.  
Id.  Judge Michel argued the literal absence of the “metal-to-metal” limitation precluded 
any possible finding of equivalency regardless of the insignificance of the differences 
between the metal-to-metal contact and the metal-to-wood contact.  Id. at 1314. Judge 
Michel stated, “[i]t stands to reason, then, that the claimed ‘metal-to-metal’ contact is 
missing altogether from the defendant’s structure, meaning equivalent infringement as a 
matter of law simply cannot occur.”  Id. at 1315. The majority disagreed, finding 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalency.  Id. at 1309-11. 
 68. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 478-79. 
 69. Id. at 479. 
 70. See Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
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The second less prevalent interpretation, the significant limitation rule, 
applies the claim vitiation doctrine with varying strictness according to 
the limitation’s importance.73  If the limitation in the patent is significant, 
any deviations from the literal scope of the claim would vitiate the 
limitation.74  The more important the claim, the less likely it will be 
found to have equivalents; therefore it would receive less protection 
from infringement than claims deemed less important.75  The main 
problem that arises under this application of the claim vitiation doctrine 
is unpredictability in both the determination of the claim’s importance 
and the amount of deviation from a significant limitation that would 
result in a finding of vitiation. 
IV.  FREEDMAN SEATING CO. V. AMERICAN SEATING CO. 
Freedman Seating Co. v. American Seating Co. exemplifies how the 
existence of various claim vitiation doctrine interpretations have made 
non-literal infringement cases more confusing and unpredictable. 
Freedman owns United States Patent No. 5,492,389 (the ‘389 patent) on 
a retractable seat designed for use in public transportation.76  Freedman 
sued American Seating for patent infringement based on the production 
and sale of its similarly designed seat.77  The American Seating seat 
did not infringe literally upon Freedman’s ‘389 patent, but the district 
court held on summary judgment that the seat infringed under the 
doctrine of equivalents.78  The court found that the differences between 
the elements comprising the two seats were insubstantial, and therefore 
the seats were equivalent79 because they performed “substantially the 
same function in substantially the same manner, to achieve substantially 
the same result.”80
 73. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 479. 
 74. Id. 
 75. The importance of a claim depends on how closely related the claim is to the 
essence of the invention as a whole.  If “deviations from the literal scope of the claim 
limitation would vitiate the essence of the invention,” then doctrine of equivalents 
infringement is precluded.  Id. at 465. 
 76. Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1351-53 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 77. Id. at 1351. 
 78. Id. at 1355. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  This is the traditional function-way-result test for equivalency from 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38 (1997) (citing 
Union Paper-Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)).  




The infringement dispute hinged upon whether the mechanisms used 
to support the two seats and to make the seats foldable could be 
considered equivalents.81  The two designs differed in the mechanism used 
to fold the seats into a vertical position.82  Freedman utilized a 
mechanism termed a “slider crank,”83 whereas American Seating’s 
mechanism was known as a “fourth link.”84  Neither mechanism is novel 
in and of itself, and both are “four bar mechanism” type designs.85
Freedman’s argument, which was accepted by the district court on 
summary judgment, was based on the traditional doctrine of equivalents 
analysis set forth in Graver Tank and Warner-Jenkinson.86  Freedman 
asserted that the term “slidably mounted” need not be read out of the 
claims to find that American Seating’s “rotatably mounted” element is 
an equivalent.87  Examining the situation in light of the traditional 
function-way-result test for equivalence, Freedman stated that the 
functions of the two mechanisms were substantially the same, providing 
support for the seat while allowing the seat to move between the 
horizontal and vertical positions. The mechanisms performed these 
functions in substantially the same way by providing the support bars 
with movable ends; both mechanisms achieved the same result, 
repositioning the support bars to allow the seats to be folded upright.88
Before the claim vitiation doctrine, this analysis would most likely not 
have been challenged.89  However, the Federal Circuit, relying on a 
combination of claim vitiation doctrine theories, not only challenged the 
analysis, but reversed the summary judgment ruling for infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents and remanded with instructions to enter 
 81. Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1355. 
 82. Id. at 1353-54. 
 83. The slider crank mechanism is comprised of four diagonal bars with one end 
fixed to the seat’s frame at a pivot point and a movable end mounted in a vertical track.  
When folding the seat up or down, the movable end slides along the track while the end 
fixed to the seat simply rotates.  Id. at 1352-53. 
 84. The fourth link mechanism does not utilize any sliding motion.  Instead it 
depends on three sets of rotation joints: one at the seat base, one at the wall or vertical 
frame, and one somewhere between the other two along the diagonal bars connecting the 
seat base and the wall or vertical frame.  Id. at 1354.  See  infra Appendix, for diagrams 
of the two designs. 
 85. Four bar mechanisms are common to engineering and consist of four rigid bars 
with pin (rotational) joints at their ends.  The relative lengths of the bars are varied to 
achieve different results.  D. Cheshire, Mechanism Design, http://www.staffs.ac.uk/ 
~entdgc/wildfiredocs/mechanisms.pdf. 
 86. Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1355, 1357. 
 87. Id. at 1357. 
 88. Id. 
 89. This assertion is based on the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Freedman after examining the situation using the traditional doctrine of 
equivalents analysis.  Id. at 1355. 
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a judgment of non-infringement for American Seating.90  The Federal 
Circuit drew this conclusion by applying the claim vitiation doctrine in a 
manner which can be described as a combination of the Lourie rule, the 
no limitation rule, and the significant limitation rule.91  The necessity of 
using this medley of legal theories and doctrines to determine whether 
two devices are alike raises a warning flag about the state of the law.  
The outcome of such a determination is difficult to predict, and it is 
unlikely that courts could apply this legal tangle consistently.   Nevertheless, 
the Federal Circuit came to its conclusion that no reasonable jury could 
find equivalency between the folding mechanisms of the two seats in 
this manner. 
The court found the basic authority for its analysis, like most decisions 
based on the claim vitiation doctrine, in the Warner-Jenkinson opinion 
and the all elements rule.  The court stated that the all elements rule “holds 
that an accused product or process is not infringing unless it contains 
each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an equivalent.”92  The 
court then concluded that the all elements rule requires that “an element 
of an accused product or process is not, as a matter of law, equivalent to 
a limitation of the claimed invention if such a finding would entirely 
vitiate the limitation.”93  This was the court’s generalized restatement of 
the claim vitiation doctrine. 
The court then proceeded to acknowledge the confusion that surrounds 
the use of the claim vitiation doctrine, stating: 
There is no set formula for determining whether a finding of equivalence would 
vitiate a claim limitation, and thereby violate the all limitations rule.  Rather, 
courts must consider the totality of the circumstances of each case and 
determine whether the alleged equivalent can be fairly characterized as an 
insubstantial change from the claimed subject matter without rendering the 
pertinent limitation meaningless.94
 90. See id. at 1364. 
 91. See id. at 1357-62. 
 92. Id. at 1358 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 
17, 29 (1997)). 
 93. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29). 
 94. Id. at 1359 (citing Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328, 
1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (“Permitting such an element in the accused product to come 
within the bounds of the claimed element would impermissibly extend the scope of the 
claim language beyond what the patentee actually claimed.”); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 
Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1317-21 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Sage Prods., Inc. v. 
Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 




The court did, however, provide some insight into making this 
determination based on the “totality of the circumstances” of the case.95  
The court stated that circumstances including the simplicity of the 
structure, the specificity of the claim, and the foreseeability of variation 
at the time of the claim filing should be taken into consideration.96  It 
suggested that no vitiation occurs if there is only a subtle difference in 
degree provided by limitations as opposed to vitiation where there is a 
“clear, substantial difference or difference in kind.”97  The court also 
placed the burden of specific claim drafting squarely on the patentee: “it 
is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection for 
this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.”98
The court then applied these guidelines to the facts in Freedman.  It 
stated that a finding of equivalency would vitiate the limitation 
designating Freedman’s mechanism as “slidably mounted”99 because the 
movable ends of American Seating’s seat could only rotate, not slide.100  
The court declared this structural difference was not a “subtle difference 
in degree,” but was instead a clear, substantial difference or difference in 
kind.”101  In essence, this conclusion applies the Lourie version of the 
claim vitiation doctrine.  Treating every word of a claim as a limitation 
precludes the possibility of finding an equivalency between “slidably” 
and “rotatably.”  
This equivalency problem probably could have been avoided by 
carefully drafting Freedman’s claim with language precluding application 
of the claim vitiation doctrine.  Freedman knew of other similar  types of 
four bar mechanisms that could foreseeably have been used in this kind 
of invention.102  For example, Freedman could have claimed a support 
member incorporating a four bar mechanism rotatably or slidably 
mounted to the seatbase.  Yet Freedman specifically chose the language 
that it did.103  Freedman’s choice of claim language served the public 
notice function of the patent and “[m]embers of the public were 
therefore justified in relying on this specific language in assessing the 
bounds of the claim.”104
The court’s analysis also incorporates features of the two less 
frequently applied interpretations of the claim vitiation doctrine.  In 
 95. Id. at 1359-61. 
 96. Id. at 1360. 
 97. Id. (quoting Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 149 F.3d at 1321). 
 98. Sage Prods., 126 F.3d at 1425. 
 99. See Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1361. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. at 1360 (citing Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 149 F.3d at 1321). 
 102. See id. at 1362. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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accord with the no limitations rule, the court relied on the claim vitiation 
doctrine to preclude finding an equivalent which would require a 
limitation to be read so broadly that the limitation no longer acts as a 
limitation at all.105  Specifically, the court refused to find that the 
“slidably mounted” limitation could be read so broadly as to include 
“rotatably mounted” or any other known form of four bar mechanism.106  
This narrow reading of the claim is based on the public’s need to rely on 
the specific language used to mark the scope of the claim: “we think that 
to now say the claims include other four bar mechanisms under the 
doctrine of equivalents would unjustly undermine the reasonable 
expectations of the public.”107
The second less frequently applied interpretation, the significant 
limitation rule, may also have played an unstated part in the court’s 
analysis.  That view applies the claim vitiation doctrine with varying 
strictness according to the importance of the limitation.108  If the 
limitation in the patent is significant, any deviations from the literal 
scope of the claim would vitiate the limitation.  In this case the limitations 
concerning the folding mechanism of the seat were the very heart of the 
patent.109  Without those limitations, there would be no patent: Freedman 
would just have a normal seat.  According to the significant limitation 
rule, because the limitations concerning the folding mechanism of 
Freedman’s seat are so important to its patent, any deviation from the 
literal scope of the claim vitiates the limitation. 
The Federal Circuit presented a well-reasoned argument to support its 
finding of non-infringement in the Freedman case.  However, the broad 
range of available precedent and the multiple versions of the claim 
vitiation doctrine that have been expressed can arguably support a 
finding of non-infringement in practically all non-literal patent 
 105. See id. at 1361-62.  This reasoning coincides with the court’s conclusions in 
Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  In Tronzo, the court held 
that finding a hemispherical cup equivalent to a limitation for a “generally conical outer 
surface” would vitiate that limitation.  Id.  Broadening the scope of what “conical” 
means to the point where it would include “hemispherical” renders the “conical” 
limitation meaningless.  Id.  Therefore, “conical” and “hemispherical” cannot, as a 
matter of law, be equivalents.  Id. 
 106. Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1361-62. 
 107. Id. at 1362. 
 108. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 479. 
 109. See Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1352-53. 




infringement disputes.110  Judges and attorneys can browse through the 
case law and pick the version of the claim vitiation doctrine that best fits 
their needs.  The available theories are simply too broad, and without 
restraint could lead to the vitiation of the doctrine of equivalents itself. 
Too much confusion exists and unpredictability abounds.  Patentees, 
attorneys, and judges do not receive enough guidance from the existing 
state of the law to pursue their respective goals with any real confidence 
in the outcome.  The procedural posture of Freedman highlights this 
unpredictablity.  The district court ruled that no reasonable jury could 
find there was non-infringement and the Federal Circuit Court ruled  no 
reasonable jury could find there was infringement.  Two such polar 
opposite holdings, reached after applying what is supposed to be the 
same law, are symptomatic of unclear law. 
A further source of concern is that both courts decided the case on 
summary judgment, yet the issue of whether the accused product 
contained each claims limitation is supposedly a question of fact for a 
jury to decide.111  Summary judgment is appropriate only where no 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.112  
Yet  in this case the district court granted a summary judgment of 
non-infringement, and the Federal Circuit Court granted a summary 
judgment of infringement.  The level of disagreement between the courts 
on a matter meant to be decided by a jury is disconcerting. 
The problems arising from the various applications of the claim 
vitiation doctrine raise the question of whether such a doctrine should 
exist when there are already limitations in place reining in the doctrine 
of equivalents where necessary.  The established limitations provided by 
 110. Dennis Crouch, supra note 8 (stating that “[e]very defendant now has an 
arguable vitiation position—since, by definition, the [Doctrine of Equivalents] is only 
applied against products that do something different than what is required by the 
claims”).  An opinion to the contrary was also voiced: “the [Freedman] decision merely 
confirms that the Doctrine cannot be used to avoid a claimed linkage between two 
structural elements that would otherwise destroy its effect.”  William F. Hienze, 
Doctrine of Equivalents Must Not ‘Vitiate’ Limitation, I/P UPDATES, http://www.ip-
updates.blogspot.com/2005/08/doctrine-of-equivalents-must-not.html (Aug. 12, 2005) 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006). 
 111. See RF Del., Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (citing Bai v. L & L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  Patent 
infringement is a two part inquiry.  Id. (citing Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per 
Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  First, as a question of law, the court 
must construe the claims of the patent.  Id.  Second, as a question of fact, the accused 
product or process must be examined to determine whether or not it contains each 
limitation of the claims.  Id.; see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 
149 F.3d 1309, 1317-21 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (assessing infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents depends on the facts of each case). 
 112. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
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prosecution history estoppel,113 specification estoppel,114 and the all 
elements rule limit the doctrine of equivalents relatively easily in 
comparison to the claim vitiation doctrine.  The Freedman case could 
have been decided using the traditional doctrine of equivalents and its 
limiting constructs less confusingly and more predictably than the 
analysis supplied under the claim vitiation doctrine. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Freedman case demonstrates the degree of confusion and 
unpredictability the claim vitiation doctrine creates.  It is not clear that 
the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson intended to create the claim 
vitiation doctrine.  It is also unclear whether the doctrine is a necessary 
or beneficial limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.  As it now stands, 
the claim vitiation doctrine causes more trouble than it is worth.  The 
state of the doctrine merits either abandonment or clarification to the 
extent it will result in uniform application. 
To clarify the law, the Federal Circuit should make an en banc ruling 
in the next case on the Federal Circuit’s docket that addresses these 
complicated issues involving the claim vitiation doctrine and the 
doctrine of equivalents.115  If the Federal Circuit retains the claim 
vitiation doctrine in some form it should not embrace either the Lourie 
or Michel rules because both lack the flexibility and fact-intensive 
investigation that are at the core of the doctrine of equivalents.116  Instead, 
the doctrine should focus on the type of examination used in the no 
limitation rule.  The infringement issue should be taken away from a 
jury only when an equivalent would truly vitiate a limitation in a claim 
to the point that no reasonable jury could find that the alleged equivalent 
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way 
to achieve substantially the same result as the patented subject matter.  
 113. Prosecution history estoppel estops a patentee from reclaiming limitations that 
were removed or narrowed during prosecution for patentability reasons.  Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34 (2002). 
 114. In specification estoppel, when the specification “makes clear that the 
invention does not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the 
reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without 
reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the 
feature in question.”  SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys, Inc., 242 
F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 115. Shulman & Rupert, supra note 5, at 486. 
 116. Id. at 482-83. 
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Had Freedman been decided using only the no limitation rule 
interpretation of the claim vitiation doctrine, the outcome could have 
been the same and, in any event, the analysis would have been more 
clear and concise. 
Compare the more sensible remedy for the problems arising from the 
claim vitiation doctrine: complete abandonment.  No real, compelling 
argument exists that creation of the doctrine was intended in the first 
place.  The doctrine’s genesis in Warner-Jenkinson arguably appeared in 
dicta.  When read in context, the language from which the doctrine 
developed simply seems to be commentary on when to apply summary 
judgment in doctrine of equivalents cases.  It does not appear to be an 
expression of the Court’s dissatisfaction with the then-existing state of 
the law, nor does it appear to call for a new doctrine decreasing the 
jury’s role in equivalency factual determinations.  As reflected in the 
Freedom case, this less-than-solid foundation, coupled with the practical 
difficulties that have arisen from  multiple interpretations of the claim 
vitiation doctrine, prompts the conclusion that the doctrine should no 
longer be applied.  To effectively extinguish the claim vitiation doctrine, 
the Supreme Court should expressly disapprove it or the Federal Circuit 
should reinterpret it in a different light.  At the same time the Court or 
Federal Circuit could reaffirm the traditional function-way-result test 
for equivalency, reaffirm the doctrine of equivalents-limiting constructs 
of prosecution history estoppel, specification estoppel and the all elements 
rule, and reestablish the doctrine of equivalents as it existed before the 
emergence of the claim vitiation doctrine. 
ROBERT PRIBISH 
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American Seating Company’s seat design with the “fourth link” mechanism.  Freedman 
Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 
Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005).   
Freedman Seating Company’s seat design with the slider crank mechanism.  U.S.  
Patent No. 5,492,389.  Freedman Seating Co., 420 F.3d at 1354. 
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